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Gilman v. Nevada State Bd. Med. Exam’rs, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. 31
(May 9, 2004).1
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
Summary
Bradley Gilman appealed an order denying judicial review of a disciplinary action
taken against him by the Nevada State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners.
Outcome/Disposition
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court affirmed the order of the Eighth
Judicial District Court in part, but reversed the district court’s denial of review of the
Nevada State Board of Medical Examiner’s assessment of costs and fees against Gilman.
Factual & Procedural History
Appellant Bradley Gilman was a veterinarian at Green Valley Hospital. On
October 22, 1998, a couple took their pet beagle to the hospital for an examination and
vaccinations. Because the beagle had been experiencing intestinal problems for four
days, Gilman obtained permission from the couple to x-ray the beagle for an intestinal
blockage. Gilman asked Greg Krasch, an unlicensed veterinary technician, to perform
the autopsy. The dog was agitated and Gilman told Krasch to seek permission from the
owners to sedate the dog before performing the x-rays. Nonetheless, Krasch took the xrays without sedating the beagle.
When the owners returned to pick up the dog, the animal collapsed. Gilman
checked the dog for signs of shock but did not tell the owners why the beagle was in
shock. He instructed the owners to transport the beagle to the Emergency Animal Center
to be monitored overnight. Unfortunately, after being treated for shock at the Center, the
beagle died that night. The owners filed a complaint against Dr. Gilman with the Nevada
State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners (“the Board”). Gary Ailes, DVM,
investigated the incident and the Board filed an Accusation against Gilman on August 31,
1999.
At an evidentiary hearing on December 13, 1999, “[t]he Board voted to convict
Dr. Gilman of incompetence and gross negligence under NRS 638.140(5), an ethics
violation under NAC 638.046 and incompetence under NRS 638.140(5) for the use of an
unlicensed veterinary technician.”2 The Board suspended Gilman’s license for sixty days
and placed Gilman on probation for three years. Additionally, the Board assessed
$18,093 against Gilman for costs and attorney’s fees.
Subsequent to the Board’s ruling, Gilman filed a petition for judicial review but
the district court denied review. He appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court and the court
remanded the case to district court to remand “to the Board for a determination of
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whether Dr. Gilman’s misconduct was shown by clear and convincing evidence.”3 At a
public hearing, the Board announced that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated
Gilman had engaged in misconduct. The district court affirmed the Board’s decision and
assessment of costs. Gilman moved to file supplemental records and motions in the
Nevada Supreme Court that would show the disciplinary action violated his due process
rights. The Nevada Supreme Court granted the motion.
Discussion
Gilman made several arguments to support his challenge to the Board’s action.
First, he argued that the members of the Board could not serve as impartial decision
makers. Second, Gilman maintained that the Board abused its discretion by assessing
“Board Costs” against him and that the Board improperly levied $7,145 in expert witness
fees against him. Third, Gilman argued that the Board should not have ordered him to
pay the investigation and hearing attendance fees of Dr. Mike Chumrau. Fourth, Gilman
contended the Board failed to show that he was grossly negligent or incompetent by
satisfactory proof and the Board’s finding that he had acted incompetently by hiring an
unlicensed technician violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Finally, Gilman
alleged the Board violated his due process rights because it did not allow his attorney to
make objections to the record or to highlight exculpatory evidence in the record at the
public meeting conducted by the Board on remand.
1.

Impartial Decision Makers

Gilman cited three reasons why the Board’s actions constituted an
appearance of bias: (1) no independent hearing officer; (2) the imposition of $18,093
against Gilman; and (3) the money went into the Board’s operating fund instead of into
the state general fund. Although the Board members did have some fiscal responsibility
for the Board’s finances, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the Board members’
pecuniary interest was too remote to impart the appearance of bias.
It reasoned that the percentage of the costs assessed against Gilman was too small
of a percentage of the Board’s total budget. Furthermore, the court found that in light of
the Board’s budgetary surplus and the ample evidence to support the Board’s allegations
against Gilman no temptation existed for the Board to find against Gilman solely for
pecuniary gain. The court also determined that depositing the costs in the Board’s
operating fund did not show bias. Only fines must be given to the state general fund but
costs are a way for the Board to recuperate the expenses it incurred during the
investigation. Nonetheless, the court held that the Board erred when it imposed
attorney’s fees against Gilman because there is no statutory basis to do so.
2.

Board Costs & Expert Witness Fees

The Board assessed $1,737 for travel, hotel and meals for nine people for
two days and per diem and travel expenses for Dr. Bernard Cannon. Because the Board
members are practicing members who must leave their practice for the day to conduct the
3
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hearings, pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes (“NRS”) 639.040 and 281.160, they are
entitled to salary, per diem, and travel expenses. Thus, the court held that the Board did
not abuse its discretion to the extent it charged Gilman for those costs of its members and
employees. However, the court reasoned that the Board improperly assessed those costs
for the prosecuting attorney because the prosecuting attorney was employed by the state’s
Attorney General’s office. The court, therefore, reversed the district court’s affirmance
of Board Cost’s for anyone who was not a Board member or employee.
Gilman argued that the award of $7,145 in expert witness fees was improper
because NRS 18.005(5) only allows the recovery of $1,500. NRS 18.005 sets forth what
types of costs may be recovered by a prevailing party in a civil case in district court.
Because no mention of the amount of costs recoverable by the Board in disciplinary
actions exists in NRS 638.147(10) (repealed 2003), the court used NRS 18.005 to assist it
in determining whether the Board abused its discretion. Besides setting a limit of $1,500,
NRS 18.005 allows the district court to determine “that the circumstances warrant a
larger fee.”4 Hence, the court determined that the Board did not abuse its discretion
because most of the evidence against Gilman came from expert’s testimony.
3.

Dr. Chumrau’s Fees

Because Dr. Ailes was the investigator on his case and Dr. Mike Chumrau
did not submit a detailed explanation of his services, Gilman argued that the assessment
of Dr. Chumrau’s investigation and hearing attendance fees against him were improper.
The court agreed. It held that an administrative board “must also demonstrate ‘how such
fees were necessary to and incurred in the present action.’”5 As a result, the court ruled
the district court erred by denying judicial review on the basis of Dr. Chumrau’s costs.
4.

Satisfactory Proof & Prohibition Against Ex Post Facto Laws

Gilman contended that the district court erred in its application of the
“substantial evidence” standard under Nevada Revised Statute 233B.135. Instead,
Gilman argued, the court should have applied the “satisfactory proof” standard which the
Nevada Supreme Court has defined as clear and convincing evidence.6 The court issued
an order of limited remand on that basis and the Board determined that Gilman’s
misconduct was shown by clear and convincing evidence. Because the record revealed
that the evidence sufficiently supported the Board’s findings, the court affirmed the
district court’s denial of review regarding the standard of proof.
Additionally, Gilman argued the Board violated the prohibition against ex post
facto laws because at the time of his hearing, the statute did not bar the use of unlicensed
veterinary technicians. Although the court agreed that NRS 638.013 did not affirmatively
state veterinary technicians must be licensed, the court reasoned that, in context with
other statutes which specify licensing for veterinary technicians or criminalize practicing
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as a veterinary technician without a license,7 the statutory scheme requires that veterinary
technicians be licensed. In addition, the court also pointed out that pursuant to NRS
638.1406(2), a veterinarian may be disciplined for employing an unlicensed technician.
Therefore, the court concluded the Board did not abuse its discretion in finding that
Gilman was incompetent for hiring an unlicensed technician.
5.

The Board’s Refusal to Allow Counsel to Make Objections or
Exculpatory Remarks

Gilman’s last challenge to the Board’s decision was that the Board’s
refusal to allow his attorney to object or speak on his behalf at the evidentiary hearing on
remand violated his due process rights. The court held the Board did not violate
Gilman’s due process rights. It reasoned that the proceeding was quasi-judicial in nature
and so long as the Board gave Gilman proper notice of the hearing, Gilman did not even
have to be present. Further, the court stated that the Board merely summarized the record
and neither side was allowed to point to inculpatory or exculpatory evidence. Finally, the
court found that all the members of the Board had read the record and could disregard
any inaccuracies.
Conclusion
This case should provide a guide to administrative agencies and those facing
disciplinary action from an administrative agency. It sets forth an explanation regarding
what costs a prevailing agency may collect in a disciplinary action. The court also
highlighted the importance of detailing the costs and providing reasons for the costs.
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